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Access to justice is one of the promises of Minnesota.  This 
promise is reflected in our constitution, where the people of 
Minnesota promised each other that in our state each individual 
has the right “to obtain justice freely . . . promptly and without 
delay.”1  Given the import our founders placed on access to justice, 
the delivery on that promise may rightly be described as a “first 
principle” of Minnesota.2  In this article, we begin with a historical 
perspective on Minnesota’s commitment to the first principle of 
access to justice.  Then, we turn to the present reality regarding 
that commitment here and elsewhere, focusing on some of the 
consequences of a less-than-steadfast adherence to the timely 
delivery of access to justice. Finally, we conclude with 
recommendations to ensure that the promise of access to justice 
continues to be a reality in Minnesota.  
 
       †     Lorie S. Gildea is the Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court. 
      ††  Matt Tews was Chief Justice Lorie S. Gildea’s judicial clerk for the                  
2011–2012 term.  
 1. Article I, section 8 of the Minnesota Constitution provides: “Every person 
is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may 
receive to his person, property or character, and to obtain justice freely and 
without purchase, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, 
conformable to the laws.” 
 2. Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist papers that first principles 
were “primary truths upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend.”  THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 31, at 236 (Alexander Hamilton) (Howard Mumford Jones ed., 
1972). 
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I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Minnesotans have long understood that access to justice 
requires the courts to be open to all.3  This bedrock principle is 
enshrined in Article I, Section 8 of our constitution, and it is also 
the focus of one of our supreme court’s earliest cases, Davis v. 
Pierse.4  The case was decided against the backdrop of the Civil War, 
and it involved a statute passed by our Legislature that was 
intended to aid the Union in its “efforts to put down 
[the] . . . rebellion.”5  In that statute, the Legislature “suspend[ed] 
the privilege of all persons aiding the rebellion . . . [from] 
prosecuting and defending actions and judicial proceedings” in 
Minnesota.6  F.A.W. Davis, a resident and citizen of the secessionist 
State of Mississippi, sought redress in a Minnesota court in 
connection with property located in Minnesota in which Davis 
claimed an interest.  The statute, however, ostensibly prevented 
Davis from pressing a claim in Minnesota state court.7 
Davis argued the statute was unconstitutional and void.8  The 
court agreed.  Speaking eloquently for the court, our first chief 
justice, Lafayette Emmett, described the Legislature’s decision to 
pass such a law in the midst of national crisis as “forgetting justice, 
and disregarding the wholesome restraints of our fundamental 
law.”9  After rejecting various grounds on which to save the statute, 
Chief Justice Emmett concluded that while striking the statute 
down may be unpopular, all Minnesotans “must regard as [a] 
matter of pride and gratulation, that in this State no one, not even 
the worst of felons, can be denied the right to simple justice.”10 
The result in Davis v. Pierse is grounded in the importance our 
supreme court placed on the principle of access to justice.11  That 
priority is also reflected in how the courts in Minnesota are 
organized, funded, and governed.  Based on the principle that all 
in Minnesota are entitled to access to justice, our court system 
transformed itself in the last century to be better positioned to 
 
 3. See Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13, 23, 7 Gil. 1, 11 (1862) (“[I]n this State no 
one, not even the worst of felons, can be denied the right to simple justice.”). 
 4. Id. at 23, 7 Gil. at 11. 
 5. Id. at 16, 7 Gil. at 3. 
 6. Id. at 15, 7 Gil. at 3. 
 7. Id. at 17, 7 Gil. at 6. 
 8. Id. at 14, 7 Gil. at 1–2. 
 9. Id. at 16, 7 Gil. at 4. 
 10. Id. at 23, 7 Gil. at 11. 
 11. See id. 
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deliver access to justice to all.  The process was a long one, 
beginning in the late 1980s and not concluding until the 21st 
century was in its infancy. 
Prior to the transformation, Minnesota’s court system was 
funded primarily at the county level.12  This county-funded system 
had many disadvantages, including an unequal delivery of services, 
“[s]everance of . . . policy decisions from the funding decisions,” 
“[f]ragmented and . . . limited fiscal oversight,” and the 
dependence of the third branch of state government on the 
uncoordinated decisions of eighty-seven county governments.13  In 
order to remedy these problems, in 1989 the judiciary embarked 
on a fifteen-year transformation toward exclusive state funding.14  
Complete state funding was achieved on July 1, 2005.15  The fact 
that the Minnesota Judiciary’s funding now comes from one source 
helps to present a unified and coordinated budgetary message.  It 
also helps to ensure that the funding provided to the Judicial 
Branch is used to promote branch-wide strategic initiatives and 
priorities.16 
As part of the transition to state funding, in 2005 the judiciary 
also introduced a new governance model.  By order of chief justice 
Kathleen Blatz, the policy-making authority for the Judicial Branch 
was delegated to the newly formed Minnesota Judicial Council.17  
The Judicial Council, a twenty-five-member body chaired by the 
chief justice, is made up of nineteen judges, including the chief 
judge of the court of appeals and the chief judge of each of the 
ten judicial districts, five court administrators, and one “at-large 
appointment from within the Judicial Branch.”18  Council members 
work in courthouses around the state and at both the district and 
appellate levels.19 
The “right to simple justice”20 that Chief Justice Emmett wrote 
about in Davis v. Pierse means that the people of Minnesota deserve 
 
 12. See Sue Dosal, Transition and Transformation: The Minnesota State Funding 
Project, 22 CT. MANAGER 18, 18 (2007).   
 13. Id. at 18–19.   
 14. Id. at 19.   
 15. Id. at 23. 
 16. See id. at 18–23.  
 17. In re Order Establishing Judicial Council, Adm-04-8003 (Minn. Dec. 10, 
2004). 
 18. Membership, MINN. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.mncourts.gov/?page=1055 
(last visited Sept. 11, 2012).  
 19. Id. 
 20. Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13, 23, 7 Gil. 1, 11 (1862). 
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a court system that provides equal access to timely justice no matter 
where in the state they live.  In other words, justice should look the 
same all around Minnesota.  With the transition to state funding 
complete, and through the leadership of the Judicial Council, the 
judiciary in Minnesota is better positioned to ensure that all 
Minnesotans have the same access to justice, and thereby honor the 
“right to simple justice.” 
II. PRESENT REALITY 
Davis v. Pierse stands for the principle that closing the 
courthouse doors to even one person, “even the worst of felons,” 
and even in a time of crisis, impugns “our fundamental law” and 
denies the constitutional “right to simple justice.”21  Yet in 
Minnesota and across our nation, judicial budget constraints are 
threatening—quite literally—to close courthouse doors.22  Bill 
Robinson, President of the American Bar Association, expressed 
the problem in these terms: “The simple truth is inadequate 
funding threatens to undermine the ability of our state courts to 
function properly.”23 
The problem of inadequate funding has put America’s state 
courts in crisis.24  From Washington25 to Florida26 and               
 
 21. Id. 
 22. See, e.g., ROY WEINSTEIN & STEVAN PORTER, ECONOMIC IMPACT ON THE 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES AND THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA OF FUNDING CUTBACKS 
AFFECTING THE LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT 2 (2009) (stating that funding cuts 
caused the Los Angeles Superior Court to close on the third Wednesday of each 
month); Herbert B. Dixon, The Real Danger of Inadequate Court Funding, 51 JUDGES’ 
J. 1, 43 (2012) (“[T]he failure of state and local legislatures to provide adequate 
funding is effectively—at times quite literally—closing the doors of our justice 
system.”); Karen Weise, U.S. Courts Face Backlogs and Layoffs, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK., 
Apr. 28, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2011-04-27/u-dot-s-dot                       
-courts-face-backlogs-and-layoffs (discussing how Alabama was forced to close 
courts on Fridays to keep costs down). 
 23. Letter from Bill Robinson III, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Lorie S. 
Gildea, Chief Justice, Minn. Supreme Court (Jan. 24, 2012) (on file with 
addressee). 
 24. AM. BAR ASS’N, CRISIS IN THE COURTS: DEFINING THE PROBLEM 1 (2012) 
[hereinafter CRISIS IN THE COURTS] (“The courts of our country are in crisis.”). 
 25. See generally COURT FUNDING TASK FORCE, BD. FOR JUDICIAL ADMIN., JUSTICE 
IN JEOPARDY: THE COURT FUNDING CRISIS IN WASHINGTON STATE (2004) [hereinafter 
CRISIS IN WASHINGTON] (describing the funding situation in Washington state).  
 26. See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE COST OF JUSTICE: BUDGETARY THREATS 
TO AMERICA’S COURTS 5 (2006) [hereinafter COST OF JUSTICE] (describing how a 
$100 million cut to the judicial budget forced the chief justice of the Florida 
Supreme Court to beg the state bar to lobby for court funding).  
4
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Maine27 to California,28 courts are struggling to provide quality 
judicial services.  Across the nation, studies have shown that today’s 
courts are “less efficient, and judicial decisionmaking is 
[becoming] less expedient.”29  And in some states, long delays and 
inefficiencies are threatening to deny citizens a “basic access to 
justice.”30 
The cause of this unprecedented crisis is decreasing judicial 
branch budgets.31  While state court budgets have been in decline 
over the last decade,32 the financial crisis beginning in 2008 
brought on the deepest cuts.33  In the three years after 2008, “the 
courts of most states [were] forced to make do with 10 to 15% less 
funding than they had in 2007.”34  These cuts were made despite 
the fact that the courts of every state make up only a tiny portion of 
the overall budget; “not a single state in America spends more than 
4 percent of its annual budget on its judiciary, and . . . many states 
fund their courts at less than 1 percent.”35  In many jurisdictions, 
the cuts have been exacerbated by the increased filings that have 
accompanied the economic downturn.36 
 
 27. Criminal Justice System Faces Crises Due to State Budget Cuts, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Oct. 26, 2011, available at http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2011/10 
/criminal_justice_system_faces.html (discussing how, since 2007, Maine’s judiciary 
budget has been cut but the court system has seen a fifty percent increase in civil 
filings). 
 28. See generally WEINSTEIN & PORTER, supra note 22, at 2–16 (describing how a 
lack of funding has negatively affected California’s, and especially Los Angeles’, 
courts).  
 29. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE 
IMPACT OF RECENT BUDGET CUTS IN NEW YORK STATE COURT FUNDING 1 (2012). 
 30. Editorial, Threadbare American Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2011, at A20 
[hereinafter Threadbare American Justice]. 
 31. CRISIS IN THE COURTS, supra note 24, at 3. 
 32. Dixon, supra note 22, at 1. 
 33. See CRISIS IN THE COURTS, supra note 24, at 4. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Edwin Meese III & William T. Robinson, Our Liberty Depends on Funding 
Our Courts, So They Can Protect All of Us, FOX NEWS, Jan. 16, 2012, 
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/01/16/our-liberty-depends-on-funding 
-our-courts-so-can-protect-all-us/; see also COST OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 2–3 (“In 
most states, the entire budget for the state judicial system amounts to less than 
four percent of the state’s overall annual budget.”). 
 36. WASHINGTON ECON. GRP., INC., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS ON THE GEORGIA 
ECONOMY OF DELAYS IN GEORGIA’S STATE COURTS DUE TO RECENT REDUCTIONS IN 
FUNDING FOR THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 3–4 (2011) [hereinafter DELAYS IN GEORGIA] 
(discussing that caseloads are increasing while the judiciary budget is decreasing 
in Georgia); John Schwartz, Critics Say Budget Cuts for Courts Risk Rights, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 27, 2011, at A18 (noting that courts are seeing an increased case load as a 
result of the financial crisis). 
5
Gildea and Tews: The Right to Simple Justice: The Primary First Principle
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012
  
2012] THE RIGHT TO SIMPLE JUSTICE 11 
State judicial branches have responded to this decrease in 
financial support in a variety of ways.37  Courts in Alabama,38 
California,39 Oregon,40 Iowa,41 South Carolina,42 and Ohio43 have 
been forced to close courthouses on certain days of the week.  New 
Hampshire’s chief justice effectively suspended civil jury trials for a 
year.44  Delaware and Oregon have even had to postpone criminal 
trials.45  Many states, including New York and Kansas, have either 
raised filing fees, increased surcharges, or both.46  The judicial 
branches of South Carolina, California, Colorado, and 
Connecticut, among others, have laid off, furloughed, or frozen the 
hiring of employees.47  And most drastically, some states, including 
Washington, Utah, and California, have permanently closed some 
courthouses.48 
We, in Minnesota, have not been immune to the crisis.  In 
2003, it was estimated that, due to extremely high caseloads caused 
by a shrinking budget, our district court judges had on average only 
120 seconds of court time to spend on many case types.49  More 
recently, our court offices have been forced to keep shorter hours.50  
And with funding cuts leaving the judiciary with ten percent fewer 
people to do the work,51 “[b]acklogs  and  delays  are  increasing  in 
 
 
 37. Weise, supra note 22 (describing how some courts have pared spending, 
trimmed hours, laid off staff, or delayed trials). 
 38. Id. 
 39. WEINSTEIN & PORTER, supra note 22, at 2. 
 40. Dixon, supra note 22, at 1. 
 41. Id. 
 42. COST OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 8. 
 43. Schwartz, supra note 36. 
 44. Weise, supra note 22. 
 45. COST OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 5, 7. 
 46. Dixon, supra note 22, at 1. 
 47. COST OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 4–8. 
 48. Id. at 4, 8. 
 49. Id. at 6.  See generally State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403 (Minn. 2004). 
 50. Jennifer Smith, Justice Denied, Lawyers Unpaid?, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Feb. 9, 
2012, 6:35 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/02/09/justice-delayed-lawyer       
-unpaid. 
 51. Pam Louwagie, Cuts Could Mean Justice Denied, STAR TRIB., March 22, 2011, 
http://www.startribune.com/printarticle/?id=113823889 (stating that “[a]bout 
250 court positions around the state are vacant”); see also Almanac: Justice Lorie 
Gildea (Twin Cities Public Television broadcast May 4, 2012), available at  
http://www.mnvideovault.org/mvvPlayer/customPlaylist2.php?id=23422&select 
_index=6&popup=yes#0 (stating that because of budget cuts the judiciary is 
running “about 10% short of the people [it] needs to do the people’s work”). 
6
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Minnesota.”52  For example, in 2009, almost one-third of our 
serious felony cases took over one year to process, and in some 
districts it was taking “more than a year for a misdemeanor case to 
be set for trial.”53  On the civil side, the delays caused by inadequate 
funding have the business community watching the court system 
“with increasing concern.”54  Overall, the budgetary pressure placed 
on our court system has negative constitutional, public safety, and 
economic impacts. 
The potential constitutional consequences of the budgetary 
crisis are significant. Both the United States and Minnesota 
Constitutions separate government into three distinct branches: 
executive, legislative, and judicial.55  One of the primary purposes 
of this system is for each branch to balance and check the others, in 
order to prevent consolidations or abuses of power.56  It is of vital 
importance to this system of checks and balances that the judicial 
branch remains independent and coequal with the political 
branches.57 
Our justice system is the cornerstone of our democracy.58  The 
core constitutional function of the judicial branch is to “protect 
individual rights and liberties against overreaching by [the] 
political and popular majorities” represented by the other two 
branches.59  The courts are where people go to protect or defend 
the things that are most dear to them; whether it be their family, 
property, or freedom, it is ultimately the justice system that protects 
 
 52. DANIEL J. HALL, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, RESHAPING THE FACE OF 
JUSTICE: THE ECONOMIC TSUNAMI CONTINUES 2 (2011).  
 53. Id. 
 54. Weise, supra note 22. 
 55. See U.S. CONST. arts. I–III; MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 56. Meese & Robinson, supra note 35 (“The Founding Fathers separated our 
government into three co-equal branches by design, with each, at times, checking 
the other branches and holding them to their limited purpose.”). 
 57. This core principle has been recognized numerous times throughout the 
centuries, perhaps never so persuasively as when Montesquieu opined that there is 
no liberty “if the power of judging is not separate from legislative power and from 
executive power.”  MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 157 (Anne M. Cohler et 
al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1752); see also COST OF JUSTICE, supra note 
26, at 1 (“The Constitution . . . establishes a judiciary that is independent from and 
equal in stature to the executive and legislative branches.”); cf. JOHN LOCKE, TWO 
TREATISES ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT: BOOK II, §§ 143, 150, 159 (Ballantyne Press 1884) 
(1690) (opining that the separation of powers is the key to good government). 
 58. See, e.g., MONTESQUIEU, supra note 57; see also CRISIS IN THE COURTS, supra 
note 24, at 19 (“Strong, effective, and independent justice systems are a core 
element of our democracy.”). 
 59. COST OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 2. 
7
Gildea and Tews: The Right to Simple Justice: The Primary First Principle
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012
  
2012] THE RIGHT TO SIMPLE JUSTICE 13 
the people and safeguards their rights.60  Despite its important role, 
the judicial branch has always been considered the weakest of the 
three branches.61  The judiciary lacks the power to fund itself and 
strives to separate itself from the political process.  As such, the 
courts are in “continual jeopardy of being overpowered” by the 
other branches.62  One way the political branches can overpower 
the judicial branch is by cutting its public funding.63  Inadequate 
funding undermines the judicial system’s ability “to fulfill [its] 
important constitutional duties” and protect the rights that the 
public holds dear.64  In essence, “[e]ven the most eloquent 
constitution is worthless with no one to enforce it,”65 and no one 
can get “justice if the courts are closed.”66 
Unfortunately, courts across the country are swamped by huge 
dockets and decreasing budgets, and as a result, it is doubtful that 
any fully deliver the justice that our citizens need and deserve.67  
When our courts function properly, delivering efficient and 
thoughtful results, public confidence in the government is 
strengthened.68  But “[w]hen they begin to fail, faith in the entire 
system of government deteriorates.”69  Thus, “[t]he court crisis 
affects more than just the justice system.  It compromises citizen[s’] 
faith in our government.”70  It is therefore of vital constitutional 
importance that our courts be adequately funded.71 
 
 60. See Schwartz, supra note 36. 
 61. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 491 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin 
Fletcher Wright ed., 1972) (“[T]he judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of 
the three departments of power; that it can never attack with success either of the 
other two; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against 
their attacks.” (footnote omitted)). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Cf. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 391 (1819) (noting that the “right 
to tax, without limit or control, is essentially a power to destroy”).  Likewise, the 
power to fund or not to fund is essentially the power to destroy. 
 64. COST OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 1. 
 65. CRISIS IN THE COURTS, supra note 24, at 19. 
 66. Weise, supra note 22 (quoting Stephen Jack, President, Am. Bar Ass’n) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 67. Threadbare American Justice, supra note 30. 
 68. See CRISIS IN THE COURTS, supra note 24, at 19. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 
655 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“With all its defects, delays and 
inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free 
government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made 
by parliamentary deliberations.  Such institutions may be destined to pass away. 
But it is the duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them up.”); G. Gregg 
8
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Not only do budget constraints impact the judiciary’s ability to 
meet its constitutional obligations, but cuts to judicial branches also 
have negative consequences for public safety, with high human 
costs.  A key court function is to ensure public safety and order 
through the fair and expeditious handling of criminal cases.  But 
across the country, delays brought on by the judicial budget crisis 
are adversely affecting courts’ ability to resolve cases promptly.72 
The effect is most obvious in the criminal context.  The United 
States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a 
speedy trial.73  In most states, whether a defendant’s right to a 
speedy trial has been violated is determined by statute, criminal 
procedure, and case law.74  With many states facing delays in their 
criminal dockets, they have been forced to either “warehous[e] 
untried defendants in local jails (at additional expense to other 
government agencies) or releas[e] potentially violent offenders 
simply because further pre-trial detention is either constitutionally 
impermissible or practically impossible.”75 
In some states, speedy trial violations—or releases in lieu of 
speedy trial violations—have come in cases with drastic 
consequences.  Georgia courts have dismissed several indictments 
against people because they could not be brought to trial fast 
 
Webb & Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Independence, the Power of the Purse, and 
Inherent Judicial Powers, 88 JUDICATURE 12, 14 (2004) (“[W]hile there are things 
[we] may have to give up in these trying fiscal times, justice cannot and must not 
be one of them.”). 
 72. CRISIS IN THE COURTS, supra note 24, at 5; see also N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, 
supra note 29, at 1; Threadbare American Justice, supra note 30 (“As they cut spending 
on the courts, state legislatures are degrading public safety by delaying the 
resolution of criminal cases; [and] hurting vulnerable populations like children 
and the elderly . . . .”). 
 73. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The Minnesota Constitution guarantees criminal 
defendants the same right.  MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6; see also State v. Widell, 258 
N.W.2d 795, 796 (Minn. 1977). 
 74. Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.09 provides that, following a 
speedy trial demand, a criminal defendant’s trial must commence within sixty days 
unless good cause is shown.  If a trial does not start within sixty days, a 
presumption is raised in favor of concluding that the defendant’s speedy trial right 
was violated, and the courts look to a four-factor balancing test to determine 
whether it has been deprived.  See, e.g., Widell, 258 N.W.2d at 796 (citing Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)) (providing that the four factors to be considered are 
the length of the delay; the reason for the delay; whether the defendant asserted 
his right to a speedy trial; and whether the delay prejudiced the defendant).  
 75. CRISIS IN THE COURTS, supra note 24, at 6; see also COST OF JUSTICE, supra 
note 26, at 4 (delaying criminal trials means that “[i]nnocent people may . . . 
languish in jail, or potentially dangerous criminals may be released, denying 
justice to crime victims and endangering public safety”). 
9
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enough.76  In one instance, two murder suspects were set free 
because prosecutors took four years to indict the suspects.77  The 
prosecutors in that case claimed that “strained resources were 
partly to blame for the delay.”78  Budget constraints causing delays 
in Oregon’s criminal justice system resulted in three criminal 
defendants being released in a single day due to speedy trial 
violations.79  In Washington State, crowded court calendars have 
caused speedy trial violations for a decade.80  In one tragic case, a 
violent felon was “[r]eleased from prison, . . . broke into the home 
of a young mother and raped her, and while fleeing from police, 
crashed his vehicle into a motorist, killing [an] innocent 
bystander.”81 
In Minnesota, criminal appellants have had convictions 
reversed on speedy trial grounds in recent years.82  In State v. Colbert, 
Colbert’s simple robbery and first-degree aggravated robbery 
convictions were overturned due to a speedy trial violation.83  
Colbert was arrested on October 16, 2007, and made a speedy trial 
demand on November 7, 2007, but his trial did not start until 
August 5, 2009; 659 days after arrest.84  Colbert’s trial was delayed 
several times, but at least six months of the delay were attributable 
 
 76. See, e.g., Kemp v. State, 724 S.E.2d 41, 46 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (reversing 
and remanding a conviction for a determination of whether a defendant’s speedy 
trial right was violated due to congested court calendars). 
 77. Criminal Justice System Faces Crises Due to State Budget Cuts, supra note 27. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See State v. Adams, 116 P.3d 898 (Or. 2005); State v. Davids, 116 P.3d 894 
(Or. 2005); State v. Johnson, 116 P.3d 879 (Or. 2005); see also COST OF JUSTICE, 
supra note 26, at 7 (noting that at least two wily Oregonian thieves have caught on 
to the budgetary constraints in the judiciary and discussing how an accused car 
thief went on a spree in which he allegedly stole five cars from sale lots.  “He was 
arrested and released three times in one month because the judicial system lacked 
resources to provide him with a lawyer and thus could not prosecute him.  
Another car thief was arrested and released seventeen times”). 
 80. CRISIS IN WASHINGTON, supra note 25, at 4, 34. 
 81. Id. at 4. 
 82. See, e.g., State v. Colbert, No. A10-55, 2011 WL 67785, at *6 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Jan. 11, 2011) (reversing conviction for speedy trial violation); State v. 
Griffin, 760 N.W.2d 336, 340 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (affirming convictions against 
speedy trial arguments, but confirming that “good cause for delay does not include 
calendar congestion” (emphasis added)).  But cf. State v. Hahn, 799 N.W.2d 25, 32 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (discussing defense counsel’s unsuccessful argument that 
conviction should be reversed due to speedy trial violation caused by court-
funding-related delays). 
 83. 2011 WL 67785, at *6. 
 84. Id. at *1. 
10
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to the court’s calendar congestion.85  While the prosecutor argued 
that delay due to the court’s overcrowded calendar should not 
count against the State, the court of appeals explained that 
“[o]vercrowding in the court system is not a valid reason for 
denying a defendant a speedy trial,” and that “[t]he responsibility 
for an overburdened judicial system cannot, after all, rest with the 
defendant.”86  In concluding that Colbert’s conviction must be 
reversed due to a speedy trial violation, the court lamented that 
“the delays in this case likely were an undesirable consequence of the 
budgetary constraints on our judicial system.”87 
While speedy trial violations in the criminal realm are the most 
apparent consequence of overcrowded courts, the ramifications of 
delays can be just as significant in the civil realm.  The Minnesota 
Constitution’s guarantee of prompt justice does not distinguish 
criminal and civil cases.  But, because speedy trial and other 
legitimate public safety concerns make it important to prioritize 
criminal cases, delays in the civil actions are often more lengthy.88  
For example, in many states, custody disputes are being delayed for 
years; plaintiffs with meritorious claims are being forced to settle 
cases for far less than they are worth rather than wait for justice;89 
and court services to the indigent, crime victims, homeless, non-
English speakers, and the disabled are being curtailed or 
eliminated.90 
Sadly, delays due to a lack of funding in sensitive civil matters 
can lead to tragic results.91  In Washington, overcrowding in the 
court system caused significant delays in child welfare cases.92  In 
one such case, child welfare officials attempted to permanently 
remove a three-year-old girl from her mother, a woman with drug 
and other substance abuse problems, so that the girl could be 
adopted.93  But the delays lasted so long that the original officials 
were taken off the case, and new officials decided to reunite the girl 
 
 85. Id. at *4. 
 86. Id. (citations omitted). 
 87. Id. at *6 (emphasis added). 
 88. CRISIS IN THE COURTS, supra note 24, at 5; Schwartz, supra note 36 
(discussing that a Georgia district court put a moratorium on all civil trials in 2009 
in an effort to meet criminal defendants’ speedy trial demands). 
 89. Dixon, supra note 22, at 43. 
 90. Id. 
 91. CRISIS IN THE COURTS, supra note 24, at 5. 
 92. See CRISIS IN WASHINGTON, supra note 25, at 4–5, 20. 
 93. Id. at 5, 20.   
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with her mother.94  Tragically, the mother viciously kicked her little 
girl to death within a year.95  Here, in Minnesota, budget cuts to the 
court-funded guardian ad litem program have also resulted in 
tragedy.  In 2004, a court evaluator (without the assistance of a 
guardian ad litem due to budget constraints) recommended that a 
young girl be placed into the care of a convicted child-sex 
offender.96  Only months later, the man was “charged with three 
counts of felony sexual molestation involving [that] little girl.”97  As 
these examples illustrate, the human costs associated with judicial 
budget cuts have been great. 
Delays in the judicial system also have significant negative 
impacts on businesses and state economies.  It has long been 
generally accepted that “legal institutions are crucial to economic 
development.”98  The theory is fairly simple.  Legal institutions 
provide ordered society, and order makes economic development 
more likely.99  Moreover, it is widely accepted that delays in the 
administration of justice increase the cost on litigants and their law 
firms, preventing them from using their resources elsewhere.100  
These truisms have been confirmed in recent studies on the effects 
of underfunded courts in Georgia and California. 
A 2011 study on the economic impact of delays in Georgia’s 
court system recognized that the court system is a key to the 
economic development of Georgia because “the efficient 
disposition of civil, domestic relations and criminal cases 
impacts . . . both the business and social climate” of the state.101  
The study concluded that “[c]ourt delays due to the lack of proper 
funding represent dead-weight cost to the economy in terms of lost 
economic output, labor income and fiscal revenues.”102  Lack of 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. COST OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 6–7. 
 97. Id. 
 98. F.B. Cross, Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1737, 1738 (2002). 
 99. See, e.g., id. at 1738–39. 
 100. See DELAYS IN GEORGIA, supra note 36, at 10–11 (stating that a major 
negative economic impact of court funding problems are the “[o]pportunities 
forgone as businesses and individuals deal with the uncertainty of having to wait 
for the Court System to hear their case and render a decision,” and acknowledging 
that “case delays result in additional costs for all litigants [though s]ome costs can 
be quantified while others cannot”); Weise, supra note 22 (“The longer [a case] 
drags out, the cost of representing [a] company increases.”). 
 101. DELAYS IN GEORGIA, supra note 36, at 1. 
 102. Id. 
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court funding over several years, according to the study, resulted in 
the loss of between 3,457 and 7,098 private and public sector 
jobs.103  It was estimated that court delays brought on by a lack of 
funding decreased the total income of Georgia’s workers anywhere 
from $176 million to $375 million each year.104  And court delays 
were projected to decrease Georgia’s GDP by between $243 million 
and $583 million annually.105  Overall, the inadequately funded 
courts in Georgia were expected to adversely affect Georgia’s 
economy by between $337 million and $802 million annually.106  
After reviewing this eye-opening study, Carol W. Hunstein, Chief 
Justice of the Georgia Supreme Court, opined that she did not 
“know that you would have a new business or corporation that 
would want to relocate in a state where you couldn’t get your 
contract disputes or your business disputes resolved in a timely 
fashion.”107 
A 2009 study of the economic impacts of court cutbacks on Los 
Angeles made similar findings and conclusions.108  The main 
impact of underfunding, according to the study, would be 
courtroom closures resulting in delays.109  The study predicted that 
the caseload clearance rates—the difference between the number 
of cases filed and the number of cases disposed of—“would decline 
at an even greater pace” due to cutbacks.110  As a result, “the 
average time between filing and disposition [of civil cases would] 
increase by more than 150 percent . . . [to an average of] four-and-a-
half years.”111  The study noted that delays in case dispositions raise 
uncertainty among business and that “uncertainty makes businesses 
less prone to invest and expand operations”112 because “generally, 
resources at issue between litigants are removed from circulation 
 
 103. Significantly, most of the jobs lost were in the high-wage (and thus high 
tax bracket), high-knowledge industries.  Id. at 14. 
 104. Id. at 15. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1. 
 107. Schwartz, supra note 36. 
 108. See WEINSTEIN & PORTER, supra note 22, at 17.  The Los Angeles Superior 
Court system is akin to many states’ entire trial court system.  With over 600 
courtrooms and over 2.8 million filings per year, it is the largest trial court system 
in the country.  Id. at 2. 
 109. Id. at 1. 
 110. Id. at 5–6. 
 111. Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 
 112. Id. at 10. 
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until disputes are resolved.”113  Overall, the study concluded that 
the consequences of the judicial budget cuts, in Los Angeles alone, 
would be severe. Through 2013, those consequences were 
projected to be: “$30 billion in lost economic output, including 
losses of $13 billion resulting from decreased legal services and $15 
billion associated with additional uncertainty on the part of 
litigants . . . [a]pproximately 150,000 lost jobs . . . [and] $1.6 billion 
in forgone state and local tax revenue.”114 
The Georgia and California studies demonstrate the irony of 
cutting judicial budgets.  By underfunding the judiciary, 
legislatures “think [they are] saving a million dollars . . . .  But in 
fact [they are] incurring tens of millions of dollars of costs on 
consumers of the justice system who now have to wait, have to 
travel, have to incur additional fees—have to just generally have 
justice delayed.”115  Simply put, there are dire constitutional, public 
safety, and economic consequences to underfunding our court 
systems, consequences that plainly outweigh the illusory benefits 
offered to support such cuts. 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is clear that our courts are in a budgetary crisis.  But why?  
Why, with all the negative impacts associated with underfunded 
courts, have legislatures across the country seen fit to cut judicial 
budgets?  There appear to be two answers.  The first is the lack of a 
unified constituency for the courts.116  While many in the legal 
community are taking notice of the problem, more need to take 
action to present a united front to our state legislatures.117  The 
second, related to the first, is a lack of public knowledge of the 
problem.  While the courts exist to serve all members of the public, 





 113. Id. at 15. 
 114. Id. at 17 (emphasis added). 
 115. Smith, supra note 50. 
 116. See, e.g., COST OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 2. 
 117. Smith, supra note 50 (noting that court funding issues have “united 
supporters as disparate as the NAACP and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s 
Institute for Legal Reform”). 
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recognize their importance unless, and until, they need them.”118  It 
is incumbent upon all of us in the legal profession to do more to 
inform the public of what is at stake if the courts continue to suffer 
from budgetary setbacks. 
In Minnesota, we have begun what must be an ongoing 
grassroots education campaign on the topic of an adequately 
funded justice system, and we have launched a broad-based, 
organized lobbying effort.119  We assembled a coalition of justice 
system partners to lobby on behalf of the justice system during the 
last budget-setting legislative session.  As a result of these efforts, we 
were successful in reversing the trend of three straight years of 
budget cuts for our courts.120  We also saw our public defenders 
receive a very small increase in their budget.121  Other areas of the 
justice system, however, continued to suffer cuts, including civil 
legal services,122 confirming that there is so much work yet to be 
done. 
The education campaign we began must continue, and it must 
be expanded if the justice system is going to be well-positioned for 
the hard conversations and the competition for the allocation of 
scarce public resources in the years to come.  The Minnesota State 
Bar Association (MSBA) is partnering with the Judicial Branch in 
this effort.  The MSBA has created the AMICUS Society as a way to 
solidify and institutionalize its commitment to the ongoing 
conversation with the people of Minnesota.123  Through the 
AMICUS Society, lawyers all across Minnesota have committed to 
 
 118. COST OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 2 (advocating drastic action and 
encouraging that “judges close their courtrooms and release [criminal] 
defendants . . . so that the public becomes aware of the budgetary crisis”); see also 
Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court Funding, and Inherent Judicial 
Powers, 52 MD. L. REV. 217, 251 (1993). 
 119. See Terry Votel, Wherever Two or More Are Gathered, BENCH & B. MINN., (Dec. 
14, 2010), http://mnbenchbar.com/2010/12/%E2%80%9Cwherever-two-or         
-more-are-gathered%E2%80%9D/ (discussing the Coalition to Preserve 
Minnesota’s Justice System’s concerted lobbying efforts). 
 120. Compare Act of July 20, 2011, ch. 1, art. 1, §§ 3–10, 2011 Minn. Laws 693, 
694–96, with Act of April 1, 2010, ch. 215, art. 11, §§ 3–9, 2010 Minn. Laws 219, 
278, and Act of May 15, 2009, ch. 83, art. 1, §§ 3–9, 2009 Minn. Laws 1024,      
1025–1027 (court-related appropriations 2009–2013). 
 121. Compare § 10, 2011 Minn. Laws at 696, with § 9, 2010 Minn. Laws at 278, 
and § 9, 2009 Minn. Laws at 1027. 
 122. Compare § 3, subd. 3(a), 2011 Minn. Laws at 695, with § 3, subd. 3, 2010 
Minn. Laws at 278, and § 3, subd. 3, 2009 Minn. Laws at 1026. 
 123. Brent Routman, The AMICUS Society: Advocates for Justice, BENCH & B. MINN. 
(Feb. 6, 2012), http://mnbenchbar.com/2012/02/the-amicus-society-advocates     
-for-justice/. 
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shape opinions of leaders and legislators in their communities 
about the importance of adequate funding for Minnesota’s justice 
system.124  We are hopeful that by taking our case directly to the 
people in a sustained, organized way, our message will be heard 
and understood. 
Ultimately, it is up to “we the people” of Minnesota to ensure 
that the promise we made to each other in our constitution 
continues to be a first principle in Minnesota.  If we are successful, 
we will help keep the promise of Minnesota.  We will also help to 
ensure that the inspiring command from our first chief justice—
that in Minnesota no one can be denied the right to “simple 
justice”125—continues to be reality. 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13, 23, 7 Gil. 1, 11 (1862). 
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